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Abstract. Fraud victims are often refused a refund by their bank on the
grounds that they failed to comply with their bank’s terms and conditions
about PIN safety. We, therefore, conducted a survey of how many PINs
people have, and how they manage them. We found that while only a
third of PINs are ever changed, almost half of bank customers write
at least one PIN down. We also found bank conditions that are too
vague to test, or even contradictory on whether PINs could be shared
across cards. Yet, some rather hazardous practices are not forbidden
at all by many banks: of the 22.9% who re-use PINs across devices,
half also use their bank PINs on their mobile phones. We conclude that
many bank contracts fail a simple test of reasonableness, and that ‘strong
authentication’, as required by PSD II, should include usability testing.
1 Introduction
Many research papers on payment security focus on the technical mechanisms 
used to prevent fraud. Yet, these often fail, and consumer confidence in payment 
systems depends on whether fraudulent transactions can be reversed, or the 
victim reimbursed. If a customer disputes a transaction, and there is no evidence 
that the merchant colluded, the question may be simply whether the bank gives 
the customer a refund. Will the bank be able to hide behind its contract terms 
in theory, and will it do so in practice?
Fifteen years ago, Bohm, Brown and Gladman surveyed the terms and condi-
tions that banks were imposing on customers in the rush to put banking services 
on-line [2]. They found some bank contracts said that a customer who accepted 
a password for on-line banking would be liable for any transaction the bank 
claimed was made with that password, regardless of whether she had actually 
made it. This was a huge change from the law on cheques, where a forged signa-
ture is null and void, so banks cannot make customers liable for forged cheques by 
their terms and conditions. The new electronic banking contracts subtly shifted 
the burden of proof to the customer.
So, where are we fifteen years later? In the US, regulations require that 
disputed consumer transactions be refunded, unless the bank can show that the 
customer actually performed the transaction, or authorised someone else to do 
so. In the EU, the 2007 Payment Services Directive ruled that customers are
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entitled to a refund unless they have been “grossly negligent” in complying with
the security procedures set out in the contract with their bank. Thus, banks may
be permitted to refuse a refund if the customer fails to follow security guidelines
correctly; and even in the USA, a bank might claim that a customer who had let
a thief get hold of their card and PIN had authorised them to debit the account.
This might be a reasonable line to take, but only if the bank’s contract terms
are fair. So, have banks been able to cheat by setting unreasonable rules (e. g.,
‘choose a password you can’t remember and don’t write it down’)? Or, are their
security rules so vague that in the case of dispute, they can always claim that
the customer is in breach? In this project, we try to find out.
We examine UK banking terms and conditions in the context of national
and EU legislation. We focus on card-present payments and ATM withdrawals
because the fraud risk of these transactions falls on the banks, maximising the
incentive for customers to be refused a refund. The most reported cases in-
volve a card being stolen (resulting in £59.7m fraud in the UK in 2014 [11]),
counterfeited (£47.8m), or intercepted in the post (£10.1m). We exclude card-
not-present (e. g., Internet) transactions (£331.5m), as their fraud risk falls on
the merchant.
The vast majority of card-present transactions in the EU now require a PIN.
In these cases, the bank may claim that the customer must have been grossly
negligent in protecting it. Hence, we study how people actually use cards and
PINs. We are interested in whether customers can practicably comply with typ-
ical bank contract terms, and whether they actually do in reality.
2 Legal and Regulatory Context
Banking contract terms are regulated everywhere. In the US, Federal Reserve
regulations E and Z limit consumer liability for fraudulent debit and credit
transactions at $50 (unless for debit transactions the customer did not promptly
notify the bank of a lost or stolen card, in which case the limit is $500). Liability
does not depend on whether the customer was negligent, and the only way to
refuse a refund is to argue that the customer actually authorised the transaction
or authorised someone else to perform it. In practice, fraud victims are generally
refunded unless the bank suspects they are in cahoots with the merchant.
Practice in the EU was harmonised in 2007 by the Payment Services Directive
(PSD), which states that customers are not liable for unauthorised transactions
when their card is not stolen, and liability would be capped at e150 if it was.
However, these limitations do not apply if the customers “failed with intent
or gross negligence to fulfil one or more of his obligations under Article 56”,
which requires that customers comply with banking terms and conditions and, in
particular, to “take all reasonable steps to keep its personalised security features
safe”. So, what counts as ‘reasonable’?
European banks typically use the “gross negligence” exception when they
choose to deny a refund, but its definition is left to national rules and practices.
As an example, banks commonly state that it is gross negligence to write down
2
a PIN and keep it with the card. However, in practice, for a customer to be held
liable, it is only necessary for the adjudicator to believe that gross negligence is,
on the balance of probabilities, the most likely explanation.
The PSD requires that there be a means of adjudicating disputes without
going to court. This was considered necessary because many European countries
practice ‘costs shifting’, whereby the loser of a civil case pays the winner’s costs,
which could far exceed the sums in dispute.
The UK adjudicator is the Financial Ombudsman Service, from whose deci-
sions we can see what they consider to be gross negligence. For example, in one
case [5], a stolen debit card was used, and while the customer denied writing
down the PIN, the bank records showed that the correct card and PIN had been
used. The adjudicator observed that the customer had not used the card on the
day (reducing the likelihood of shoulder-surfing), and concluded that the most
likely explanation for the transactions was that the PIN was kept with the card.
The customer was, therefore, held liable.
In one of the few UK cases to get to court [7], the judge also found that
the most likely explanation for disputed ATM transactions was that either the
customer had made the transactions, or the customer allowed them through
intent or negligence. This decision was based on expert witness testimony from
the bank, stating that there had never been a breach of the Chip and PIN system
at an ATM, the disputed transactions were near the customer’s home, and the
total disputed amount did not exceed the available balance of the account. The
customer was refused a refund and ordered to pay £15,000 of the bank’s costs.
Of course, there are other explanations for how the PIN could have been
obtained in both of these cases; the same PIN could have been used on another
card or on the customer’s mobile phone, or the PIN check could have been
bypassed technically [8]. The outcome may turn on whether the adjudicator
believes the bank or the complainant, which in turn may depend on their access
to independent expertise.
The facts that people tend to choose PINs that are easy to guess, and that
they tend to set the same PIN on multiple cards, mean that guessing a PIN is
possible for about 1 in 11 stolen wallets [3], but a bank could argue that this is
only a result of poor PIN choice and still amounts to gross negligence. Therefore,
we examine guidance given to customers, to see if customers are set sufficiently
clear and consistent rules with which they can reasonably be expected to comply.
3 Review of Banking Terms and Conditions
We surveyed the terms and conditions of a number of banks. We looked for
instructions or advice on how users should handle the PINs associated with
their cards. As an example, we consider HSBC [6], one of the big British banks.
PIN memo clauses. Banks’ terms of service often provide guidance on writing
down and recording PINs. HSBC forbids its users from writing PINs down any-
where, except in an “obfuscated” fashion that others cannot easily reconstruct.
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It stipulates: “Never writing down or otherwise recording your PINs and other
security details in a way that can be understood by someone else”. It is not spec-
ified whether it is the PIN that should not be understood, or the connection
between the PIN and the card.
PIN change clauses. Some banks tell customers whether they can change their
PINs, and how to choose a PIN. HSBC’s rules are concise, but general: “These
precautions include . . . not choose security details that may be easy to guess”.
PIN re-use clauses. Many banks have rules on whether a customer can re-use a
PIN for multiple cards. HSBC states that customer precautions include “keeping
your security details unique to your accounts with us . . . ”. This is actually in
conflict with the advice given earlier by the UK banks’ trade association, which
recommends customers to change all their PINs to the PIN issued for one of
their cards. The UK banks have also taken the necessary technical measures to
ensure that cardholders from any bank can change their PIN at any ATM.
PIN advice clauses. Common conditions include not telling the PIN to any
third party. HSBC stipulates that the PIN advice letter must be destroyed im-
mediately after receipt: “Safely destroying any Card PIN advice we send you
immediately after receipt, e. g., by shredding it . . . ”.
4 Survey of Payment Card PIN Usage
We conducted an on-line questionnaire study of how people use payment cards,
and, in particular, how many PINs they have, and how they are remembered. We
also investigated their behaviour towards storing, resetting and sharing PINs.
4.1 Questionnaire Setup
The questionnaire was set up using LimeSurvey4, and the participants were
recruited using Prolific Academic5. We restricted submissions to British residents
aged 18 or over. Participants were paid £1.50 for successfully completing the
questionnaire. The questionnaire took five minutes on average to complete. We
received 241 (out of 250) valid responses, and verified that the IP address used
was from the UK in all but 5 cases6.
Questions that required categorical responses by the participants had a set
of predefined choices as well as a free text response field. The predefined choices
were sourced from a small qualitative preliminary study. In nearly all cases the
participants did not make use of the free text response field.
4 www.limesurvey.org
5 www.prolific.ac
6 IP address geo-location has a non-trivial error rate, but this still confirms that our
sample is predominantly from the UK, as intended.
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4.2 Results
Of the participants, 61% are female and 39% are male. The age of the partic-
ipants spans 18 to 71 years, with a mean of 31.2. Our participants are better
educated than average bank customers: 38% have at least an undergraduate de-
gree (BSc, BA or similar), while a further 17% have postgraduate education.
30% did not attend higher education, and a third of these (10%) have GCSE as
their highest qualification. 49% of the participants are employed; a further 13%
are self-employed; 24% of participants are students; only 13% are unemployed.
Table 1. Distribution of participants’ PINs
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mean
4 digits 1 88 65 41 31 8 5 1 1 0 2.28
5 digits 233 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05
6 digits 228 8 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08
The participants report to possess between 1 and 9 payment cards with an
average of 2.53. This contrasts with the number of 4-digit, 5-digit, and 6-digit
PINs each participant has in Table 1. The vast majority of customers have only
4-digit PINs, but the mean number of PINs is 2.28 – statistically significantly
lower than the mean number of cards per customer (dependent t-test, t = −4.38,
p < 0.0001).
Table 2. Frequency of usage of participants’ PINs
4-digit PINs 5-digit PINs 6-digit PINs
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 Sum #1 #2 Sum #1 #2 #3 Sum
Every day 34 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Several times a week 117 30 3 3 0 0 0 1 154 1 0 1 5 2 1 8
Once per week 59 35 12 3 0 0 0 0 109 2 1 3 0 0 0 0
Once per month 21 37 24 8 3 0 0 0 93 4 2 6 3 2 0 5
Several times a year 6 24 24 12 2 2 1 0 71 1 0 1 3 0 0 3
Once a year or less 1 14 10 10 4 1 0 0 40 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Never 2 12 14 9 6 4 1 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2 analyzes how often participants use their PINs. No participant had
more than eight 4-digit PINs, or more than two 5-digit ones or three 6-digit
ones. We see at once that as the number of PINs increases, their usage drops.
Only one participant uses more than one unique PIN on a daily basis. About
half (48%) of the PINs are used at most once a month, and PIN #4 is used on
average around twice a year. This supports the bank industry ‘folk wisdom’ that
if you want customers to use cards other than their main card you must let them
change their PINs.
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Table 3. Source of 4-digit participants’ PINs
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 Sum
I chose it myself 75 56 28 15 3 3 1 0 181
Assigned to me, I decided not to change it 161 94 56 31 11 3 1 0 357
Assigned it to me, I am not allowed to change it 4 2 3 0 1 1 0 1 12
Table 3 documents PIN change, and we see that two-thirds of PINs are left
as their default. Interestingly, there is no correlation between frequency of PIN
use (Table 2) and PIN origin (Table 3). Virtually all participants are allowed
to change their PINs in the UK. The details for 5- and 6-digit PINs have been
omitted here for brevity. We also investigated the reasons for PIN change. Of
the participants that set their own PIN, 61% reported changing their PIN on
first receipt, a further 23% stated they changed their PIN because they felt it
was compromised, but only 6% claimed to change their PIN on a regular basis.
Our participants keep their PINs for a long time: Only 13% of PINs were
changed in the last year, with over 39% having been in use for over 5 years.
Remembering PINs. A quarter of the participants reported forgetting a 4-
digit PIN at least once. Of these, 48% remembered or retrieved their PIN them-
selves, 24% were issued with a new PIN, and 15% used the bank’s services to
retrieve their PIN. Finally, 10% did not bother retrieving the forgotten PIN; half
of these said they transferred their money to a different account.
Table 4. Location of written down PINs by participants. 79 (32.9%), 4 (50.0%), and
0 (0.0%) wrote down their 4-, 5-, and 6-digit PINs, respectively.
4-digit 5-digit 6-digit Sum
On the card 1% 0% 0% 1%
I kept the original PIN slip 0% 0% 0% 0%
On paper – kept in desk 16% 25% 0% 17%
On paper – kept in wallet 10% 0% 0% 10%
In a notebook/diary/planner, etc. 41% 25% 0% 40%
File on computer 10% 25% 0% 11%
File on phone 42% 25% 0% 41%
As many banks insist that PINs must not be written down, we decided to
investigate this in reality. Table 4 describes our participants’ strategies towards
writing down PINs. Not a single participant kept the original PIN mailer. The
prevailing method of PIN storage is on mobile phones – typically disguised as
a phone number. 13% of the participants use a mnemonic for 4-digit PINs, the
most common technique being the derivation of the PIN from a specific date.
(This was also reported by Bonneau et al. [3].)
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Table 5. A variety of locations where participants’ PINs are re-used. 55 (22.9%), 0
(0.0%), and 1 (7.7%) re-used their 4-, 5-, and 6-digit PINs, respectively.
4-digit 5-digit 6-digit Sum
Unlocking mobile phone 49% 0% 0% 48%
Burglar alarm 2% 0% 0% 2%
Voicemail 15% 0% 0% 14%
SIM card unlock 7% 0% 0% 7%
Unlocking computer 5% 0% 100% 7%
On-line Banking 25% 0% 0% 24%
PIN re-use. 16% of our participants stated they use the same PIN on many
payment cards; when a PIN was re-used, it was used on 2.8 payment cards on
average, with the maximum being 9 cards! PINs were also used in a variety of
other locations (Table 5): 22.9% of participants are re-using their 4-digit payment
card PINs, half of whom use a payment card PIN to unlock their mobile phone.
Table 6. Sharing of PINs by participants. 102 (42.5%), 2 (25.0%), and 1 (7.7%) shared
their 4-, 5-, and 6-digit PINs, respectively.
4-digit 5-digit 6-digit Sum
Stranger 0% 0% 0% 0%
Family member 37% 0% 100% 37%
Flatmate (if accommodation shared) 3% 0% 0% 3%
Spouse/partner 75% 100% 0% 74%
Casual acquaintance 1% 0% 0% 1%
Close friend 14% 0% 0% 13%
PIN sharing. Finally, an impressive 42.5% of our participants share their PINs,
in many cases with more than one person (Table 6). Sharing predominantly
occurs with a spouse or partner (32% of participants) or other family members
(16%), but also, in some cases, close friends (6%).
5 Conclusion
In general, it is difficult for customers to be certain whether they are complying
with bank rules, as these rules lack detail and can even be contradicted. For
example, HSBC prohibits PIN re-use, whereas the UK bank trade body rec-
ommends this [4]. Vague and contradictory guidance puts customers in a weak
position should a bank claim that a disputed transaction must have been caused
by a failure to comply with its rules.
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Our survey of PIN use confirms the practical difficulty of remembering PINs.
Customers are commonly asked to remember four or more PINs, some of which
they only use every month at most. The combined effect of forgetting over
time [10], as well as interference between the different PINs remembered [1],
makes unaided recall of these PINs a difficult task. In one study after 3 weeks,
the majority of participants were unable to remember a PIN, and even after 1
week 45% had forgotten it [9]. In current usage scenarios, customers can only
cope by re-using PINs or writing them down.
The 4-digit PIN system worked adequately in the environment for which
it was originally designed: a single regularly-used ATM card. Today’s usage
scenarios are different, but the mechanism, and terms and conditions, remain
unchanged. Not considering the usability implications pushes customers towards
insecure PIN practices banned by the banks’ contracts. Each PIN re-use allows
a thief another 6 guesses, and mobile phone touchscreens can give away PIN
digits directly. Not all customers can be expected to disguise PINs securely,
but remembering an infrequently-used PIN is impractical without some kind of
assistance. Customers who do not comply with their banking contract are then
blamed for security failures that are actually caused by a system that is not fit
for purpose.
The successor to the PSD – PSD II – adds a requirement that banks must
use strong authentication for payments. This is defined as “authentication based
on the use of two or more elements categorised as knowledge (something only
the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and inherence
(something the user is) that are independent”. The European Banking Authority
is responsible for evaluating proposed solutions. Our study shows that an authen-
tication technique must be evaluated in the context of normal use (e. g., multiple
payment instruments, some used infrequently) and only considered strong if real
people can use it in the course of their normal life. Otherwise, it risks becoming
just another excuse for some banks to shift fraud liability to their customers.
Banks want customers to use multiple cards, so they can earn more fees.
Regulators want people to use multiple cards to enhance competition. Secure
methods for using a single PIN (or two-factor authentication technique) over
all devices would remove the need for the ad-hoc coping mechanisms we see in
the survey. Alternatively, to take the US approach, enshrine strong consumer
protection in law; expect banks to use fraud detection to manage risks and
absorb the residual fraud; and by increasing trust, increase transaction volumes
and, thus, increase revenues and profits overall.
Data availability. The survey data used in this paper can be downloaded from
http://dx.doi.org/10.14324/000.ds.1473489.
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